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NOTES
Eminent Domain-Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.: Permanent Physical Occupation as a Taking
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the tak-
ing of private property for public use without the payment of just compensa-
tion.' For many years, courts have struggled to determine when, if ever, a
governmental interference with land is a "taking."'2 That this attempt has
been less than successful is suggested by one commentator's observation that
"in truth, the collected decisions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts,
leave the subject as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat."' 3 Recent cases seemed to
suggest that the Supreme Court was moving toward a unified taking doctrine.
4
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,5 the Court had to decide
whether to continue this evolution, or to retain a two-track approach that dis-
tinguishes physical invasions from other governmental interferences with land
use.
The particular issue in Loretto, as formulated by Justice Marshall, was
"whether a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property
authorized by government constitutes a 'taking' of property for which just
compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution."6 By holding in a 6-3 opinion7 that any permanent physical occupa-
tion authorized by government is a taking, regardless of the public interest it
may serve,8 the Court reaffirmed its two-track approach and signalled its un-
willingness to hasten the evolution of a unified theory.
Loretto involved a challenge by a New York City landlord to a New York
State statute9 that prohibited landlords from interfering with the installation
* 1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." This prohibition has been made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
2. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971);
Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings andDue Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1058-59 (1980).
3. Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 1059 n. 11.
4. See especially Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979).
5. 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
6. Id at 3168.
7. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined Jus-
tice Marshall in the majority. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Brennan and White joined.
8. 102 S. Ct. at 3171.
9. N.Y. Exec. Law § 828 (McKinney 1982), which provides in part:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or
premises, except that a landlord may require:
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of cable television facilities on their premises.10 The New York Court of Ap-
peals"I upheld the statute against a taking challenge' 2 after holding that it was
a legitimate exercise of the police power. 13 While it did not disturb the New
York court's determination that facilitating cable television was a valid public
purpose, 14 the United States Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the
application of the statute effected a taking.'
5
Historically, two types of governmental interferences with land use have
been subject to taking analyses: physical invasions and nonpossessory regula-
tions on use. 16 As a general rule, any physical invasion of an owner's property
by the government has been considered a taking. 17 Because the impairment in
use caused by an invasion was substantially identical to that resulting from a
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such reasonable
conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning, and appearance of the
premises, and the convenience and well-being of other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination thereof
bear the entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of such facilites; and
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord for any
damage caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities.
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for per-
mitting cable television service on or within his property or premises, or from any
cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any amount which the
commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable; or
c. discriminate in rental charges, or otherwise, between tenants who receive cable
television and those who do not.
Prior to the enactment of § 828 in 1973, Teleprompter routinely obtained authorizations for
its installations from property owners along the cable's route, compensating owners at a standard
rate of 5% of the gross revenues that Teleprompter realized from that particular property. Loretto,
102 S. Ct. at 3169.
Pursuant to § 828(l)(b), the state commission ruled that a one-time $1 payment is the normal
fee to which the landlord is entitled. Id at 3170.
10. The installation on plaintiff Loretto's building involved approximately 36 feet of cable
one-half inch in diameter (which ran along the length of the building 18 inches above the roof and
connected to the neighboring building), and two metal boxes, each occupying four cubic inches.
When Loretto purchased the property, she was unaware of the existence of the cable. Two years
after her purchase, Teleprompter dropped an additional cable down the front of the building to
provide cable television services to one of her tenants. Id at 3169-70.
11. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423 N.E.2d 320, 440
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981).
12. Id at 151, 423 N.E.2d at 334, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
13. The court noted that the statute served the public purpose of facilitating "rapid develop-
ment of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which has important educa-
tional and community aspects." Id at 143-44, 423 N.E.2d at 329, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
14. Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3171.
15. Id at 3179.
16. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964).
17. Among several cases supporting this proposition are those involving flooding, see, e.g.,
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (government dam caused flooding of plaintiff's land,
held that substantial invasion caused by flood waters amounted to a taking); Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (same); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S.
799 (1950) (destruction of agricultural value caused by flooding above highwater mark held com-
pensable as taking); utility lines, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540
(1904) (telegraph company had no right of eminent domain to construct and operate its lines on
railroad's property without railroad's consent; Court assumed that such an invasion would be
compensable as a taking); St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (city had power
to require telegraph company to pay for the exclusive, permanent use of space on poles); and
airplane overflights, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (frequent low altitude
flights above landowner's property constituted a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
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formal appropriation, courts believed that the government should compensate
the owner as if it had formally appropriated the land.' 8
In contrast to their relative inflexibility toward physical invasions, courts
have adopted two views with respect to the regulation of land use.' 9 The ear-
lier view was that the regulation of a "noxious" use was never a taking.
20
Courts reasoned that there could be no taking in these cases, either because
there was no appropriation of a proprietary interest (in contrast to the physical
invasion cases),2 1 or because uses in contravention of the public interest were
not property interests protected by the Constitution.
2 2
A second view, not necessarily inconsistent with the first, was elucidated
in Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:23 a
regulation that went "too far" would be a taking.24 The standard for deter-
mining whether a regulation crossed this amorphous boundary was the extent
of the diminution in value caused by the government's action.2 5 Holmes took
a narrow view of the property interest affected by the government's action,
2 6
and suggested that a taking was less likely to be found if a landowner bur-
dened by a governmental action received a reciprocal benefit flowing from
that action.
27
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 28 represented a watershed
in the Supreme Court's thinking about taking jurisprudence. After stating that
it had developed no "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness"
required that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
government, rather than remaining disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons, the Court identified several factors that should aid in making these
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. ' 29 The Court focused on the economic
impact of the regulation, considering particularly the extent to which the regu-
(1946) (same). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1165, 1184 (1967).
18. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 1185-86.
19. See Sax, supra note 16, at 37-42; Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 1062, 1069-70.
20. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding regulation forbidding sale
and manufacture of intoxicating liquors). See also Sax, supra note 16, at 38-40.
21. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
22. See Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1905) (holding that property rights in
hauling and disposing of garbage were not protected by the Constitution against de facto destruc-
tion by a regulation making such activities public nuisances).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute forbidding mining of coal that would remove the subadjacent
support from surface housing held an impermissible exercise of the police power when owners of
surface had failed to acquire subadjacent rights).
24. Id at 415.
25. Id at 413.
26. Holmes focused on the narrow right to mine coal under the particular house in question,
rather than the right to mine coal on the entirety of the property. Id at 413-14.
27. Holmes expressed this notion in terms of "an average reciprocity of advantage." Id at
415.
28. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central involved the application of New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law to Grand Central Station. Although its effect was to prohibit the
owners of Grand Central from developing the airspace over the terminal, the Court ruled that the
application of the law was not a taking.
29. Id at 123-24.
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lation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government's action.30 In justifying this rule, the Court re-
jected the notion that an individual should be asked to bear a disproportionate
part of the cost for a public benefit only when he has done something "wrong"
(the "noxious use" test),3 1 or when he will receive a reciprocal benefit to miti-
gate his loss (Holmes' "reciprocity of advantage"). 32 The Court also limited
the Pennsylvania Coal diminution of value standard by incorporating that
standard as only one factor in the multi-factor balancing test, and by taking a
much broader view of the property interest affected by the government's ac-
tion than that taken by Holmes. 33
Because Penn Central did not involve a physical invasion, it was unclear
from that case whether the move away from historical per se rules and toward
a unified theory based on an all-inclusive, multi-factor balancing test would be
extended to physical invasion cases as well. By observing in dicta that "a 'tak-
ing' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion. . . than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good,"34 the Court in Penn Central appeared to leave
open the possibility that a physical invasion could be accorded special weight
in the balancing process without being determinative. Two cases decided after
Penn Central seemed to suggest that the Court would continue its movement
toward a unified doctrine.
30. Id at 124. In applying these factors, the Court determined that since the owner was able
to continue to enjoy a reasonable return after the enactment of the regulation, it did not suffer a
significant loss or any substantial interference with investment-backed expectations. Id at 136. In
addition, the Court was less hesitant to uphold the governmental action since it was a regulation
ratJer than a physical invasion. See id. at 130.
31. The Court cited three cases as standing for the proposition that use regulations may be
upheld if they are "reasonably related to the implementation of a policy. . . expected to produce
a widespread benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." See 1d at 133-34 n.30,
These cases were Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (statute requiring that the opera-
tion of an existing brickyard within the city limits be terminated upheld as valid exercise of the
police power, even though its application diminished value of owner's property from $800,000 to
$60,000); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upheld order of state entomologist requiring
plaintiffs to cut down ornamental red cedar trees that contained a pest harmful to apple trees;
compensation was limited to cost of removal); and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (upheld regulation prohibiting excavations below the water table; effect was to prevent
present and presumably most beneficial use of the land). By denying that the decisions in these
cases were based on a determination that the uses involved were "noxious," when the Court had
previously characterized them as such, the Court was rejecting the noxious use rule. See Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. The owner of Grand Central Station was forced to accept a burden greater than the
benefit it received, and its use was not a noxious one. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-34. See also
i d at 147-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. The Court stated:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ....
Id at 130-31.
34. Id at 124 (citations omitted).
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In Kaiser Aetna v. United States35 the owner of a nonnavigable pond
wanted to convert it into a marina by connecting it to a navigable bay. After
obtaining the government's approval, the owner, at his own expense, dredged
a channel between the two bodies of water. The government argued that it
should be able to enjoy a navigational servitude over the now navigable (for-
merly pond) waters without paying compensation. In deciding that the actual
physical invasion resulting from the enjoyment of the servitude would effect a
taking, the Court acknowledged the applicability of the Penn Central ad hoc
test,36 noted that the owner's significant investment was based on his reason-
able expectation that the completed marina would remain private,37 and ac-
corded special weight to the character of the government's action (a physical
invasion), which would have deprived the owner of his fundamental "right to
exclude."
3 8
In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins39 the Court applied the Penn Cen-
tral test in upholding a state constitutional requirement that shopping center
owners permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on prop-
erty to which the owners had already invited the general public.4° The Court
noted that given the importance of protecting the first amendment rights at
issue, the mere fact of a physical invasion could not be determinative of the
taking question.
4 1
Thus was the stage set for the Court's decision in Loretto. While ac-
knowledging the use of the Penn Central balancing test in recent cases, the
Court concluded that when the character of the government's action rises to
the level of a "permanent physical occupation," no balancing is permitted: a
permanent physical occupation is a taking per se.42 The basis for the Court's
holding was its view that permanent physical occupations are qualitatively
more severe than other governmental interferences with land use because they
destroy three fundamental property rights: the rights to possess, use, and dis-
pose of a physical thing.43 In support for its per se rule, the majority cited as
precedent those cases on which the historical physical invasion rule had been
based.44 It cited Kaiser Aetna for the proposition that the "right to exclude"
was qualitatively superior to other rights and thus entitled to special protec-
tion, and distinguished Kaiser Aetna's holding that a physical invasion was not
determinative by drawing a distinction between "invasions" and "occupa-
tions." 45 The Court distinguished Pruneyard's holding that a physical inva-
35. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
36. Id at 174-75.
37. Id at 179.
38. Id at 179-80.
39. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
40. Id at 83-84.
41. Id
42. Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3171.
43. Id at 3176-77.
44. Id at 3171-74 (citing, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903)).
45. Id at 3175.
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sion was not determinative by drawing a distinction between "temporary" and
"permanent" invasions.
46
The Loretto dissent contains two basic themes: an affirmation that the
full Penn Central balancing test should have been applied to the facts of
Loretto, with a resulting determination that section 828 did not effect a taking;
and an attack on both the fundamental soundness of the majority's rule and its
particular application to the facts of Loretto.
Applying the Penn Central test, the dissenters would have found no tak-
ing in Loretto because: (1) the statute served the valid public purpose of facili-
tating tenant access to cable television; (2) as in Pruneyard, the fact of a minor
physical intrusion should not have been determinative; (3) the application of
the statute had minimal economic impact because it did not affect the owner's
"fair return" on her property; and (4) as Loretto had been unaware of the
cable's presence at the time she purchased the building, there was no interfer-
ence with any investment-backed expectations. 4
7
The dissenters attacked the majority's rule as "anachronistic," 48 and ex-
pressed their fear that by carving out a niche for permanent physical occupa-
tions, the majority was inviting wasteful litigation over the meanings of these
terms and encouraging the manipulation of fact patterns to take advantage of
the rule.49 While not challenging the majority's determination that the funda-
mental rights to possess, use, and dispose of property were entitled to special
protection, the dissenters contended that section 828 did not affect these rights
any differently than they were affected by other regulations that require land-
lords to suffer some physical occupation of their property without compensa-
tion.5 o They argued that Loretto did not lose any of her fundamental rights
through the operation of section 828; rather, the intrusions of section 828
should have been viewed as ones Loretto chose to endure when she made the
choice to be a landlord.5' Furthermore, they noted that if Loretto chose to
make some other use of her property, the installation of the cable pursuant to
section 828 would cease to be permanent.5 2
If an analysis of consistency is limited to an inquiry into whether a similar
rule was applied to similar facts in the past, the holding in Loretto finds some
support in precedent. To the extent that the earliest cases on which the physi-
cal invasion rule was based 53 are viewed as ones involving permanent physical
46. Id
47. Id at 3180-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Id at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Precisely because the extent to which the govern-
ment may injure private interests now depends so little on whether or not it has authorized a
.physical contact,' the Court has avoided per se taking rules resting on outmoded distinctions
between physical and nonphysical intrusions." Id at 3182 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Id at 3184 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 3184-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Examples of such regulations would be those
requiring utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, and fire extinguishers.
51. Id at 3184-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 3185 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Eg., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1949); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
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occupations, Loretto, involving a permanent physical occupation, is consistent
with them.54 In addition, Loretto arguably is not inconsistent with Penn Cen-
tral, Kaiser Aetna or Pruneyard: Penn Central is distinguishable as a case in-
volving only a regulation on use (rather than an occupation); Kaiser Aetna and
Pruneyard are distinguishable because they are respectively defined as involv-
ing an invasion (rather than an occupation) that was temporary (rather than
permanent).
A more sophisticated analysis of consistency, focusing on the Court's rea-
soning instead of on factual similarities, supports several criticisms of the
Loretto per se rule. First, the Court may have misapplied the cases on which
the physical invasion rule was based 55 by using them to support its critical
proposition that occupations are qualitatively more severe than other govern-
mental interferences with land use. 56 The decisions in these cases were based
instead on the theory that because the impairment in use caused by such inva-
sion was substantially identical to that resulting from a formal appropriation,
the government should compensate the owner as if it had formally appropri-
ated the land.
57
Second, Loretto is inconsistent with Penn Central to the extent that the
holding in Penn Central represents a considered judgment that takings are bet-
ter analyzed in terms of a multi-factor balancing test; a test in which factors
that had been considered determinative under per se rules become considera-
tions to be weighed in determining overall fairness. Thus, the Loretto per se
rule, which refuses to allow the fact of a permanent physical occupation to be
less than determinative, fails to follow the Penn Central approach.
Finally, Loretto is inconsistent with the approach followed in Kaiser
Aetna and Pruneyard, in which the Court accorded special weight in the bal-
ancing process to the fact of physical invasion without making it determina-
tive. In Kaiser Aetna the balance was between the owner's right to exclude
and the public's right of access under the navigational servitude. 58 In
Pruneyard the balance was between the right to exclude and the public's right
to enjoy its first amendment rights.59 To be consistent with this approach, the
Loretto Court would have had to frame its task in terms of balancing the right
to exclude against the right of unencumbered tenant access to cable television
(or against the larger policy consideration of state regulation of landlord-ten-
ant relations).
The soundness of the Court's per se rule also may be criticized. The rule
54. If these cases are seen as not distinguishing between invasions and occupations, they may
arguably have been overruled by Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), and
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 35-
41.
55. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). See supra note
17.
56. Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3176.
57. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 1185-86.
58. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79.
59. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 83-84.
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suffers from the fault of any per se rule: it invites the proliferation of litigation
as parties attempt to manipulate their facts to take advantage of the rule;60
and it encourages the growth of exceptions to the rule when a court wishes to
reach a different result on almost identical facts. More importantly, the two-
track approach signalled by Loretto reflects the Court's insensitivity to the role
that taking jurisprudence should play in a free society.
The essence of taking law is fairness. But a determination of when a gov-
ernmental action is a taking should depend on more than whether it is fair to
ask a particular owner to bear a disproportionate cost for a particular public
benefit. Problems develop when a court addresses the question of fairness to
the individual without considering how that action affects the fairness of its
actions toward other individuals.
Something seems appealing about a doctrine which holds that the rights
to possess, use, and dispose of a thing are particularly precious, and are to be
accorded special weight in deciding if a governmental action that destroys
them is a taking. Yet something seems wrong when that same doctrine com-
pensates a landlord for losing the use of one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on
her building,61 but denies compensation to another owner who has lost the
right to develop (at substantial profit) the airspace over its railroad terminal
building.62 The effect of combining the Loretto per se rule, which protects an
owner if the government permanently physically occupies his land,63 and the
Court's philosophy in Penn Central that an individual may be asked to bear
disproportionately the cost of a governmental regulation which effects a public
benefit, 64 is the emergence of a taking doctrine that is manifestly unfair to
those asked to bear the burdens of public regulation.
A unified taking doctrine, based upon a multi-factor balancing test in
which physical occupations are important without being determinative, has
the flexibility and sensitivity to deal with this problem.
Under this doctrine, a case involving both an actual physical invasion
(occupation), and a large diminution in value or interference with investment-
backed expectations would almost always be considered a taking.65 A case
involving a governmental regulation that causes minimal economic loss or
does not interfere with investment-backed expectations would almost never be
a taking. The cases in the middle, those involving governmental regulations
that cause significant diminutions in value66 and those involving physical in-
vasions (occupations) with little economic impact, 67 are less certain. But in-
stead of drawing a line between them, a unified doctrine would treat them
together, asking: "How much of the burden for a particular public benefit
60. See Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3184 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. As in Loretto.
62. As in Penn Central.
63. Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3179.
64. See supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., Kaiser Aetna.
66. Eg., Penn Central.
67. Eg., Loretto and Pruneyard.
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should an individual bear, given that other individuals affected by governmen-
tal action are suffering 'X' amount?"
While this framework does not dissolve the tension between Penn Central,
which upheld a regulation that caused a significant diminution in value,68 and
Loretto, which found a taking even though its minimal physical occupation
had little economic impact,69 it points the way toward a logical reconciliation.
To ensure that owners who are affected by governmental regulations are
treated the same as owners who suffer physical invasions by government, the
Court must either: (1) increase the significance of diminution in value in regu-
lation cases (making it more likely a taking will be found); (2) decrease the
significance of permanent occupations in physical invasion cases (making it
less likely a taking will be found); or (3) implement a combination of these.
In addition, a unified doctrine is attractive because it is theoretically co-
herent, and because it eliminates the "shoehorning" problems associated with
a per se rule.
The Court in Loretto wanted to make the point that the rights of posses-
sion, use, and alienation should be subject to special protection from the police
power.70 Viewing Penn Central as a case in which the police power was given
an expansive interpretation, the Court felt the need to construct a per se taking
rule that effectively rejected the Penn Central balancing approach. The Court
failed to recognize that by adopting a unified taking doctrine based upon the
Penn Central approach, it could accomplish its goal while reconciling the dis-
parate treatment afforded owners affected by regulations and those owners af-
fected by physical invasions. By remaining wedded to its two-track approach,
the Court has revitalized this treatment and further muddied the waters of
taking jurisprudence.
ROBERT M. DIGIoVANNI
68. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
70. Loretto, 102 S.Ct. at 3176-77.
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